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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the game theory, the dynamic multiperson model on infinte horizon 
have been studied by many authors. The literature in this area is mostly 
concerned with the noncooperative equilibrium point. Although such an 
equilibrium point enables individual stability for each player, it does not 
guarantee the collective stability. Actually there are many cases in which 
the players can find a multistrategy that will yield a smaller total expected 
discounted loss if we consider game processes which require some 
cooperation between the players. If the cooperation is provided, it is 
natural to set aside the multistrategies which can be improved on the 
strategies of one player and keep the others (cf. Lai and Tanaka [6, 7, 81). 
To this end we propose to consider the D-solution (see Definition 3.1) 
which is analogous to the domination structure for a multiobjective 
decision problem of Yu [12]. One can consult Lai and Ho [9] for the 
Pareto minimum of multiobjective programming. (See also Lai and Liu 
[ 10, 111 for the conditions of Pareto and Weak Pareto optimalities of mul- 
tiobjective functions.) 
In this paper, we use a convex cone instead of the nonnegative orthant 
R”, . We will see that the D-solution is a more general concept than the 
usual Pareto minimum solution in a game process. The purpose of this 
paper is to find a D-solution from a feasible set of the total expected dis- 
counted losses for all players. Here all multistrategies used by the players 
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are Markov multistrategies. For the purpose in this paper, we introduce a 
nonempty positive polar cone of a given convex cone as a rate of transfer 
of side-payment which is similar to the concept of scalarization in multiob- 
jective programming. Using such a vector to pool the loss functions of all 
players, we would modify the m-person Markov game process to a new 
decision process with a collective loss function. So we show an optimal 
multistrategy of the modified decision process is a D-solution of the initial 
game process. Under the convexity of the feasible set of all total expected 
discounted losses for all players, the converse version is also true, that is, 
any D-solution of the initial game is an optimal multistrategy of a modified 
decision process with a collective loss function. Finally, we discuss a 
relation between D-solution and the super-gradient of lower support 
function. 
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we give a 
standard formulation for a cooperative m-person discounted Markov game. 
In Section 3, we give the necessary notations in convex analysis and the 
definition of D-solution. In Section 4, we show the existence of a D-solution 
in the game system. Finally we prove the relations between D-solution and 
super-gradient. 
2. FORMULATION OF A COOPERATIVE M-PERSON MARKOV GAME 
A cooperative m-person Markov game with a discount factor is given by 
a set of 2m + 3 objects: 
(S, A’, ‘42, ... ) A”, q, r’, ?, ... ) rm, /I), (2.1) 
where 
(i) S={1,2;..} is a countable set of states in the game system, 
nameley, the state space. 
(ii) A’ is the action space of the ith player, i= 1, 2, ... , m. We 
assume that each A’ is a compact metric space. 
(iii) q is a transition probability measure which governs the law of 
motion in the game process, in other words, for any state s and any mul- 
tiaction d such that 
(s, 6) = (s, u’, u2, . . . , U”)ESX fi A’rSxA, Q-2) 
i= I 
there corresponds a probability measure q(. Is, a) defined on S which 
measures the rate of transition from s to a new state. 
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(iv) r’ is the loss function of the ith player, i = 1, 2, . . . , m, it is a real- 
valued function defined at (s, a) E S x A. 
(v) /? is a fixed discount factor, 0 < /I < 1. 
This cooperative m-person discounted Markov game is interpreted as 
follows: 
In the successive discrete time f, t = 1, 2, 3, ... , all players observe the 
state of the game system and classify the states for the game process to a 
possible state SE S. Then at the present state S, each player i chooses an 
action a’ E A’, i E ME ( 1,2, . , m}. We write these actions as a multiaction 
ii = (a’, a2, . . . , am) E A. As a consequence of the chosen Z at the state S, the 
ith player will have loss ri(s, (5) and then the process of the game moves to 
a new state s’ at the next time according to the probability measure 
q(’ I S, Cs). After that the whole process of the game system is restarted from 
the state s’. A D-solution is the cone extreme point for a given convex cone, 
it is a multiaction c~=(u’,u’;.., a”‘)~ A in any collaboration of the 
players which will minimize a collective loss function 
,,1 
1 dilJ(S, ii) 
!=I 
at each time t with respect to a given rate of transfer d = (d,, d2, . d,) for 
side-payment. 
Throughout this paper, we assume that all multistrategies chosen by the 
players are Markov multistrategies, that is, each multistrategy is indepen- 
dent of the past history in the game process, it depends only on the present 
state. We denote the Markov multistrategy by 7c = (rc’, I?, . . . , rr”‘), where 7ci 
is a Markov strategy of the ith pla$er, and each strategy rrl is specified by a 
sequence of probability measures rc (. 1 s,) on (A’, B(A’j) for a given state s, 
at the time t, where g(A’) is the Bocel field of the action space A’. If each rr; 
is independent of the time t, that is, 7~; is stationary, then each rrf is a con- 
stant measure pi and we write 
7t = (XL, k, . . . ). 
This pi E [!‘(A’)]‘, for simplicity, we write P( A’) instead of [P(A’)IS as the 
stationary strategy space of the ith player. P(A’) is the set of all probability 
measures on (A’, &?(A’)). We denote by 17’ the class of all Markov 
strategies of the ith player, i = 1, 2, . . , m. 
Now if a multistrategy 5 = (rc’, x2,..., 9’) is chosen and the game system 
starts from state SE S, then the total expected discounted loss of the ith 
player is defined by 
(2.3) 
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where S, is the state at the transition time t; 
ii = (d, 7r2,..., P) the multistrategy of the players; 
?ri = (?ci, 7c; )...) 7rf )... ) the strategy of the ith player, 
i = 1, 2,..., WI; 
rqs,, t71) = j ‘a’ j #(St, a)d77t(aIS,), 
the expected loss of the ith player for 
the given state s, at the time t; 
df,(tiIs,)= fi d7+7’I.Y,); 
i=l 




and E, denotes the expectation operator related to a multistrategy 
(n’, 7c2,..., 9’). The vector expression for I’(E)(s) is given by 
Z(f)(s) = (Z’(Yi)(s), z*(f)(s),..., P(5)(s)) 






r(s[, r, fc)= (r'(s,, t, K), rz(.sI, t, ii),..., r”‘(s,, t, 7f)) 
Ed[r(s,, t, il)ls, =s] = (..., E,[r’(s,, t, f)ls, =s] ,... )y=“=,. 
In our game system for an initial state S, all players cooperate in choos- 
ing a multistrategy 71 to minimize Z(E)(s) in the sense of domination struc- 
ture. This means that no other multistrategy yields a smaller total expected 
discounted loss under the domination structure. To this end, the players 
pool their loss functions Z’(*)(s) by using a rate of transfer d= (d,, d2,..., d ) 
with x7!= r dj = 1, and make a collective loss function 
(d, 1($(s)) = f d,l’(ii)(s) (2.7) 
i=l 
in which they wish to find an optimal mulistrategy e* to minimize (2.7) 
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over 7c E Z7= ny=, 17’. Here (2.7) is a scalarization for I(f)(s) which hap- 
pens to be the convex combination of I’(?)(S), i= 1,2,.... m. According to 
the given rate ti and the initial state S, we would show that there exists a 
multistrategy 17, = (II:,..., rc:) such that 
This multistrategy Ed is a D-solution of our game system. It is a Pareto 
optimal multistrategy for Z(*)(s). 
3. SOME ASSUMPTIONS AND D-SOLUTION IN THE GAME SYSTEM 
Let I = (+‘I,, ?c z ,..., x,) and .Y= (.Y,, .I’~ ,..., ~9,) be two m-vectors in R”, 
the inner product of s and +I’ is given by 
Let 0 = (O,..., 0) E R”. Denote by cl E and int E the closure and interior of 
the subset E c R”, respectively. A subset Cc R”’ is a cone if Kc C for 
AER,, the set of nonnegative real numbers. 
For an arbitrary subset Fin R”, the positive polar cone of F is given by 
A cone spanned by a subset E in R” is defined by 
A convex cone is a cone as well as a convex subset in a linear space. 
Now consider a subset L c R” such that 
(i) LdO, 
(ii) L+-{~~R~I(x,)))>0,forx~L}#0, (3.1’) 
(iii) L u (0) E D is a convex cone with vertex at the origin 0. 
Note that this L is a convex cone without the vertex 0 in R”. 
Throughout this paper, D always denotes a convex cone. Let 
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This set LT extends the concept of the usual rates having nonnegative 
elements, we regard it as the rates of transfer of the side-payment. 
As the usual optimization problem we would find an optimal mul- 
tistrategy in our game system under the cone condition in R”. 
DEFINITION 1. A multistrategy J?* = (K*‘, Zig,..., TC*~) is a D-solution 
for an initial state s if there is no other multistrategy rC E 17 such that 
1(71*)(s) E Z(%)(s) + L. (3.2) 
Remark. For a given closed convex cone E, if L = int E (resp. 
L= E- (O}), the multistrategy il* in (3.2) is usually said to be a E-weak 
solution (resp. E-strong solution). 
Note that the subset L in (3.2) need not be open nor closed. If L is an 
open subset, then D - (0) = L is itself an open convex cone (but D is not 
open in this case). If L is closed, then D = L u { 0) is also closed, thus D is 
a closed convex cone. Hence if L is open (resp. closed), then the mul- 
tistrategy 71* in (3.2) is a D-weak (resp. D-strong) solution in the above 
sense. For a D-solution, D-weak solution or D-strong solution, one can 
compare with the Pareto and weak Pareto optimalities for a multiobjective 
function in Lai and Liu [ 10, 111. (See also Aubin [ 1, pp. 295-2961 for 





be the set of all D-solutions of the total expected discounted multiloss at 
the given initial state s. It is similar to the terminology of all D-extreme 
points of Es given in Yu [12] (see Definition 4.1, p. 336 of [ 121). 
Now given a rate of transfer d= (d,,..., d )E L: and the collective loss 
function 
(4 I(~(s)) = 2 4 r(f)(s), 
i=l 
the players would pool their total expected discounted loss functions to 
find an optimal multistrategy for the game. The following lemma shows 
that an optimal multistrategy for the collective loss function is a D- 
solution. 
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LEMMA 3.1. Let dEL: and let &E II = n:=, ni be a multistrategJ 
ichich minimizes the function (d, I(.)(s)) over II. Then iid is a D-solution for 
an initial state s. 
ProoJ: Suppose that 71d is not a D-solution, then there is a il E I7 such 
that 
that is, there exists JE L such that 
Z(fid)(S) = Z(E)(s) + a. (3.3) 
Taking an inner product on both sides of (3.3) with a vector dE L+, we 
obtain an inequality 
(4 I(7f)(s) > < (4 I(%)(s)). 
This contradicts to the optimality of fdr and the proof is completed. 1 
4. THE EXISTENCE OF D-SOLUTION IN THE DISCOUNTED MARKOV GAME 
In this game system, we assume that each player use the stationary 
strategy so that the stationary multistrategy is specified as the mul- 
tiprobability measure: 
,ii = (p’, p?,..., f’)E fi P(A’) = P(A) 
i= I 
which is depending on an initial state s E S. Here A = JJy=, A’. For this 
stationary multistrategy ji and the state s, we write the loss function of the 
ith player by 
and 
r(s, ii) = (r’(s, ji), r2(s, ,i) ,..., rm(s, ii)), 
while the transition probability measure is given by 
(4.2) 
- - 
where ti E A = ny=, A’ and dp(a) = ny=, dp’(a’). 
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Since we have assumed that each action space A’ is a compact metric 
space, it is separable and so C(A’), the space of all continuous function on 
A’, is a separable Banach space. The dual space C( A’,)* = M(A’, @A’)) of 
C(A’) is a bounded regular measure space, so that the probability measure 
space P(A’) in C(A’)* is weak* compact. Since the unit sphere P(A’) of 
C(A’)* is metrizable if and only if the C(A’)* is separable, it follows that 
P(A)= ny=, P(A’) is separable and weak* compact in C(A)*, where 
C(A) = ny=, C(A’). 
Let Cb(s) be the set of all bounded (continuous) real-valued functions 
on the countable space S. To have a D-solution in the game system (2.1) 
we need some additional assumptions on q and Y’ for each iE M = 
{ 1, 2 ,..., m }. 
(Al ) Let q(s’ 1 s, ti) be a continuous function on ti E A for any given 
(s’, s) E s x s. 
(A2) The loss function #(s, ti) of the ith player is bounded on S x A 
and is continuous on A for every s E S. 
Then for a rate of transfer d E L: of side-payment, we define an operator 
Td on Cb(s) by 
Evidently, Tdu(s) E Cb(s) whenever u E Cb(S). For simplicity we let 
L(P)(s) = Cd r(s, 17)) + P 1 4s’) qb Is, ii). (4.4) 
S’E s 
Thus the expression of (4.3) can be rewritten by 
T&) = ,p& UP) u(s). 
Since Td is a contraction operator on Cb(s), we will be able to show the 
existence of a stationary D-solution in our game system. 
THEOREM 4.1. Let d E Lc. Suppose that the game system (2.1) satisfies 
the assumptions (Al) and (A2). Then there exists a stationary multistrategy 
fl$ satisfying the inequality 
Cd G&T) u(s)) G (4 z(f)(s)) for ail 7i E 17 (4.5) 
so that jif is a D-solution for an initial state s, that is, 
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Proof: The operator Td defined by (4.3) is a contraction operator on 
C’(S) because of the given discount factor /I?, 0 < /? < 1. Since Cb(S) is a 
Banach space with the supnorm, it follows that T, has a unique fixed point 
in Cb(S), say u*, then for each s E S we have 
U*(S) = Tdu*(s) = min Ld(fl) u*(s). (4.6) 
Ic 
Moreover, since f.,(j) u*(s) is continuous on the compact set P(A) by 
(Al) and (A2), the minimum of (4.6) is attained at a stationary mul- 
tistrategy ji:, whence for each s E S, 
u*(s) = L&$) u*(s) 
6 LAP 1 u*(s) foralljEP(A). (4.7 J 
Consequently, for an initial state s, the iterative substitution for U* in the 
first equation of (4.7) we obtain 




= (4 KG )(sJ >. (4.8) 
On the other hand, from the inequality of (4.7) it follows that, for any 
multistrategy % E 17 and any state s, at the transite time t, 
u*(s,) d Ld(f) u*(s,) 
=(d,h,,t,4)+b c ~*(~l+,)q(~,+,ls,,t,7C), (4.9 
Slt1E.S 
where T(s~, t, il) and q(s,+lj s,, I, e) are defined in a way similar to (4.1 1 
and (4.2) respectively. Then from the iterative substitution for U* in (4.9) 
we obtain 
u*(s)< -f b’-‘E,[(d, r(s,, t, ii))l.s, =s] 
r=1 
= d, ‘f j?-LE,i[r(~l, t, f)ls,=s]) 
( r=1 
= (d, Z(%)(s) 
> 
. (4.10) 
From (4.8) and (4.10), the stationary multistrategy ji$ satisfies (4.5), that 
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is, ,Q is an optimal solution to a collective loss function constructed by the 
given rate d of side-payment. Hence Lemma 3.1 and (4.5) imply that 
and the proof is complete. 1 
For the converse version of Theorem 4.1, we introduce the convexity for 
a set E with respect to a given convex cone D = L u { 0 ). 
DEFINITION 2. A set E c R” is said to be D-convex if E + D is convex 
in R”. 
THEOREM 4.2. Let a multistrategy IT* be a D-solution for an initial state 
s, and let E, (see Sect. 3) be a D-convex set such that 
cl[E,+D-Z(%*)(s)]n(-clD)= (0). (4.11) 
Then it* will minimize a collective loss function (d, Z(f)(s) > over II E ZI for a 
rate of transfer d E L: . 
Proof: Suppose that there is no vector de L+ such that 
(4 Z(f*)(s)) d (4 Z(f)(s)) for all ii E 17. 
This will imply 
(E,+D-Z(ii*)(s))*nL+ =q5, 
where (E, + D - 1(71*)(s))* is the positive polar cone of (E, + D - Z(ti*)(s)). 
Since L + is convex in R”, by the separation theorem for convex sets, there 
exists a nonzero continuous linear functional (2, .) where JE R” such that 
(2, Ll) 2 (2, Ll’) (4.12) 
for any VE(E,+D-1(%*)(s))* and LI’EL+. As OE(E,+D-Z(f*)(s)), 
(2, v’) 60 for all v’ E L ’ 
thus 
do -(L+)* = -cl(D). (4.13) 
Since D= L u (0) is a convex cone with vertex at 0, thus as v’ tends to 
zero in (4.12), the continuity of h will imply 
@,u)>O foranyvE(E,+D-1(75*)(s))*. 
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Since E, is D-convex, [Es + D - Z(%*)(s)] is a convex cone, thus 
&([E,+D-Z(il*)(s)]*)* 
= Cl[E, + D - Z(ii*)(s)]. 
Whence by (4.13) and (4.14), 
dEcl[Es+D-Z(%*)(s)]n(-clD). 
(4.14) 
This contradicts (4.11). Therefore there exists d in 
(E,+D-Z(il*)(s))*nL+ C#0), 
that is, for every Z(~~)(S)E E, and XE D, the following 
(d, I(#*)@)) < (d, Z(%)(s)+x) (4.15) 
holds for any it E ZZ. Letting x been the origin of R”, then (4.15) reduces to 
(4 z(f*)b)) < (4 z(E)(s)). (4.16) 
Hence dividing both sides of (4.16) by the positive number Idl, and letting 
a=d/ldl, we then have 
l&L: 
and 
<a, 1(77*)b) G 0, 43(S)) for all ii E 17. 
Whence the proof is complete. 1 
DEFINITION 3. A rate of transfer de L: is said to be a D-multiplier of 
77* for an initial state s if it satisfies 
(d, Z(il*)(s)) < (d, Z(f)(s)) for all I? E 17. 
It is easy to show that a D-multiplier is a “monotone decreasing” 
functional. 
THEOREM 4.3. Let d, and d, be two D-multipliers of ir: and I?:, respec- 
tively, for an initial state s. Then 
Cdl-d,, I(%:)@)-Z(f:)(s))<O. (4.17) 
Proof From the definition of D-mulitplier, we have 
(4, z(z:)(s)) G (4, z(G)(s)) 
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and 
<dz,Z(G)(s)< Cd,, I(ii:)(s)). 
Summing the above two inequalities, we obtain (4.17). 
5. D-SOLUTION AND SUPER-GRADIENT 
For an initial state SE S and Z(%)(s) E E, for a multistrategy il E ZZ, we 
define the lower support function K, on L,+ E L + u (0) (cf. (3.1) and (3.1’)) 
by 
K,(d) = 2: (4 Z(f)(s) > for all de L,+. (5.1) 
Note that L,+ # L* (see (3.1)) in general. If L is an open set in R”, then 
L,+ = L*. 
DEFINITION 4. A function f: R” + R is called super-differentiable at
2~ R” if there is a vector x E R” such that 
f(d) -f(d) < (d- 2, x) (5.2) 
for all d E R”, and such vector x is called a super-gradient offat d The set 
of all super gradients is denoted by 
and is called the super-differential off at 2. 
Note that the super-differential 8f(d) is a subset in the dual space of R”, 
it may be empty iff is not super-differentiable. The super-differential 8f is a 
point-to-set mapping. If f is super-differentiable then -f is sub-differen- 
tiable. Hence the theory established in the case of sub-differential can be 
taken over to the case of super-differential by appropriate modification. 
For example, the sub-differential is a monotone (increasing) operator and 
the super-differential is a monotone decreasing operator, that is for 
d, 34 E R”, 
(d,-d,,x,-xz)<O for all xi E 8f( d;). 
We have seen that the D-solution exists in our system, we will show that 
the total expected discounted multiloss for an optimal strategy is a super- 
gradient of the lower support function KS at the associated D-multiplier 
which we prove as the following 
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THEOREM 5.1. A multistrategy IT -* is a D-solution associated with a D- 
multiplier d~ L: for an initial state s if and only if I(%*)(s) is a super- 
gradient of the lower support function KS at JE L,?, that is, 
f(f*)(s)Eaqa). (5.3 
Proof: From definition of super-gradient, (5.3) means that 
K,(d)-K,(d)< (d-Z, f(Yi*)(s)) (5.4 
for all de L,f. In particular, we take d= 0 in (5.4) then we obtain 
K,(J) 2 (Z I(f* KS) >, 
that is 
(Z I(e*Ns)) 6 (27, o*)(s)) for all 7? E 17. (5.5) 
For (5.5) and Lemma 3.1, we obtain 
f(rC*)(s) E Ext[E, 1 D] 
so ii* is a D-solution for an initial state s. 
Conversely if fi* is a D-solution associated with the D-multiplier a~ L: 
for an initial state s, we have 
K,(iI)= (Z [(x*)(s)). (5.6) 
Then by (5.1) 
K,(d) < (4 I(z*Ns)) (5.7) 
for all de L,+. Thus by the substraction of (5.6) from (5.7), it follows that 
K,(d)-K,(d)< (d-a, Z(ii*)(s)) 
and hence I(~*)(.s)E~K,(Z). This proves the theorem. 1 
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